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Abstract
Product liability has acquired immense importance in the last 50 years.
Various studies show that when consumers are imperfectly informed about the
product related risk, the market mechanism will not lead to an efficient  outcome and
tort liability is required for economic efficiency. Many product-caused injuries are
governed by liability rules. In this paper efficiency properties of the entire class of
product liability rules when consumers are imperfectly informed about the product
related risk are studied in a unified framework. A necessary and sufficient condition
for efficiency of a product liability rule is derived. The analysis is carried out in a
somewhat more general framework.
JEL Classification: K13
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Product liability has acquired immense importance in the last 50 years.
Many product-caused injuries are governed by liability rules (Geistfeld,
2000; Harvey and Parry, 2000). Product liability rules are said to have
important implications for both producers and consumers.1 Formal eco-
nomic analysis of product liability rules has been undertaken in Mckean
(1970 a, b), Oi (1973), Goldberg (1976), Hamada (1976), Spence (1975,
1977), Polinsky (1980), Landes and Posner (1987, ch. 10), Shavell
(1980, 87 ch 3), Spulberg (1989), Boyd (1994), Miceli (1997, ch 2),
Endres and L¨ udeke (1998), and Geistfeld (2000), among others. These
studies have shown that irrespective of the product liability rule in force,
when product market is competitive and consumers have perfect infor-
mation about the risk associated with the product, market relationship
between consumers and ﬁrms will ensure eﬃcient outcome. Both, con-
sumers and ﬁrms will take eﬃcient care to prevent accident, and the
quantity produced and consumed will also be optimum. The price of the
product will adjust to reﬂect the equilibrium residual risk and the liability
rule. However, when consumers are imperfectly informed about the prod-
uct related risk, market mechanism will not lead to eﬃcient outcome and
Tort liability is required for economic eﬃciency (Spence (1977), Polin-
sky and Rogerson (1983), Schwartz and Wilde (1985), Shavell (1987,
1It is also argued that these days eﬃciency considerations strongly inﬂuence the formulation of
product liability laws. See Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability, American Law Institute
(1997), and Geistfeld (2000).
1p. 52-53), and Endres and L¨ udeke (1998) ).2 One of the objectives of
this paper is to provide an eﬃciency characterization of the entire class
of product liability rules when the consumers’ knowledge of the risk is
imperfect.
Consumers may be imperfectly informed about the risk associated
with the product use because they can not observe the level of care taken
by the producer ﬁrm. They may also be imperfectly informed about the
risk even if they knew the care taken by the ﬁrm, because they might not
know the value of the associated risk (expected loss) for the given level
of care. Existing formal analyses on the subject have largely captured
only the ﬁrst type of imperfect information on the part of consumers.3 In
Polinsky (1980), Shavell (1980, 87, ch 3), and Geistfeld (2000) when the
second type of imperfect information is taken into account, the analysis
2Alternatively, it has been argued that the ﬁrms might signal the information regarding the product
related risk to consumers through price and warrantees etc., therefore, imperfect information on the
part of consumers might not be a problem (for reference see Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). Many
studies, however, have argued that because of inadequate incentives (for informing the consumers
about the risk) on the part of ﬁrms and limited capacity of the consumers to process the information
available, unregulated market transactions will not result in optimum care by the ﬁrms and optimum
consumption by the consumers, when the latter are imperfectly informed about the risk. Also, under
certain conditions consumers might not prefer better information about the quality of the product
(Schlee, 1996). For arguments and discussion, besides above mentioned studies see Beales, Craswell
and Salop (1981), Priest (1991), Grossman (1981), Landes and Posner (1987, ch. 10), Viscusi (1991),
Burrows (1992), Caves and Green (1996), Schwartz (1988), Arlen (2000), and Geistfeld (2000), etc.
Leaving aside the issue of relative merits of tort liability for product related accidents, the focus of
this paper will exclusively be on the eﬃciency of the product liability rules.
3See Landes and Posner (1985, 87, ch 10), Shavell (1980, 87 ch 3), Miceli (1997, ch 2), Boyd
(1994), and Endres and L¨ udeke (1998). In the early analyses of product liability rules such as in
Mckean (1970a, b), Oi (1973), the consumers were assumed to be fully informed about the product
related risk.
2is restricted only to the rule of negligence and the rule of strict liability,
and to the accident contexts wherein only the ﬁrms can take care. In this
paper we study the eﬃciency property of all the product liability rules
when the consumers’ knowledge of the product related risk is limited
by both, the above mentioned, types of imperfection, and both the con-
sumer and the ﬁrm can take care to reduce the expected loss of accident.
A product liability rule determines the proportions in which the con-
sumer and the ﬁrm will bear the loss that might result from a product-
related accident, as a function of their levels of (non)negligence. When
consumers cannot observe the care taken by the ﬁrms but know the risk
associated with diﬀerent levels of care, Miceli (1997, ch 2, pp. 29-33)
shows that negligence criterion based liability rules such as the rules
of negligence, negligence with the defense of contributory negligence,
comparative negligence, and strict liability with the defense of contribu-
tory negligence are eﬃcient in that these rules induce eﬃcient care and
production/consumption of the product under consideration. For the ac-
cident contexts wherein care only by the ﬁrms can reduce the expected
accident loss, Polinsky (1980), Shavell (1980, 87, ch 3, pp. 67-68) and
Geistfeld (2000) have shown that when the consumers do not observe
the care taken by the ﬁrms and also misperceive the expected accident
loss, the rule of strict liability is eﬃcient. The rule of negligence, on the
contrary, is not eﬃcient as, under this rule, the consumers will consume
too much [too little] of the product when they under-estimate [over-
estimate] the risk.
3This paper provides a complete characterization of eﬃcient prod-
uct liability rules. The analysis is undertaken in a partial-equilibrium
framework. Though very similar to the standard framework of economic
analysis of product liability rules, the framework in this paper is diﬀerent
on at least the following three counts. First, it is a uniﬁed framework.
Second, it is somewhat more general than the standard framework. No
assumptions are imposed on the costs of care and expected loss func-
tions, apart from assuming the existence of a pair of levels of care which
minimizes the total costs of product accident. In particular, unlike the
standard framework, we allow the possibility of the existence of more
than one conﬁguration of care levels at which total accident costs are
minimized. Third, it provides a formal analysis of the entire class of
product liability rules when both consumers and ﬁrms can reduce the
expected accident loss, and the consumers’ knowledge of risk is limited
by both of the above mentioned imperfections.4
The main result of the paper shows that when consumers do not ob-
serve the level of care taken by the producer ﬁrm and also misperceive
the value of the expected accident loss for given level of care, a nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for a product liability rule to be eﬃcient
is to satisfy the condition of ‘negligent consumer’s liability’. The con-
dition of negligent consumer’s liability requires the rule to be such that
4In the literature, formal analysis is restricted only to the rules of negligence and strict liability,
and to the accident cases wherein only the ﬁrms can take care.
4(i) whenever the consumer is nonnegligent, i.e., he is taking at least the
due care, the entire loss in the event of accident is borne by the ﬁrm
irrespective of the level of care taken by the ﬁrm, and (ii) when the
consumer is negligent and the ﬁrm is not, the entire loss in the event
of accident is borne by the consumer. Speciﬁcally, our results show that
when consumers are imperfectly informed about the expected accident
loss, the rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence
and also the rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory
negligence induce eﬃcient care, output per ﬁrm the number of ﬁrms in
the industry. The rules of negligence, comparative negligence, and neg-
ligence with the defense of contributory negligence, on the other hand,
are not eﬃcient.
2. Framework of Analysis
Analysis is undertaken in a simple partial-equilibrium framework of
a competitive industry. We consider accidents that might result when
the consumers use a product made by the ﬁrms. An accident involves
two parties, the consumer and the ﬁrm. Product-related accidents diﬀer
from the accidents generally considered under liability rules in that in
product-related accidents injurers (ﬁrms) and victims (consumers) have
previously engaged in a market exchange, supposedly, with the knowl-
edge that the product might cause injuries to the consumers later on.
To start with, both ﬁrms and consumers are assumed to be risk-neutral,
an assumption to be relaxed ﬁnally. In the event of accident the entire
5loss falls on the consumer. We denote by x ≥ 0 the cost of care taken
by the consumer and by y ≥ 0 the cost of care taken by the ﬁrm. Cost
of care is assumed to be strictly increasing function of care level. As a
result, cost of care for a party will also represent the level of care for that
party. Let X = {x | x is the cost of some feasible level of care which
the consumer can take } and Y = {y | y is the cost of some feasible
level of care which the ﬁrm can take }. Also, 0 ∈ X and 0 ∈ Y . The
output of the ﬁrm and the amount of purchase made by the consumer
will be treated as their respective activity levels.
Let π be the probability of accident and H ≥ 0 be the loss in the
event of accident. π and H are assumed to be functions of x and y;
π = π(x,y), H = H(x,y). Let L denote the expected loss due to ac-
cident. Thus, L(x,y) = π(x,y)H(x,y). x, y, π, H, and L are deﬁned
per unit of the product. Clearly, L ≥ 0. L is a decreasing function of
care level of each party;5 a larger care by either party, given the care
level of the other party, results in lesser or equal expected accident loss.
Formally:
Assumption (A1) (∀x,x0 ∈ X)(∀y,y0 ∈ Y )[x > x0 → L(x,y) ≤
L(x0,y), and y > y0 → L(x,y) ≤ L(x,y0)].
Total accident costs (TAC) per unit of product are the sum of costs
5It is generally assumed that only the ﬁrms can take care to reduce the risk. As will be discussed
later, this becomes a special case in our analysis.
6of care by the two parties and the expected loss due to accident; TAC
= x + y + L(x,y). Let M be the set of all costs of care conﬁgurations
which are TAC minimizing; M = {(´ x, ´ y) | ´ x + ´ y + L(´ x, ´ y) is minimum
of {x + y + L(x,y) | x ∈ X,y ∈ Y }}.
Assumption (A2) X, Y , and L are such that M is non-empty.
2.1 Social Objective:
As the issue dealt with is of product caused injuries, the product is
assumed to be homogeneous in all respects except the risk of loss asso-
ciated with the product. A product-accident context is characterized by
the speciﬁcation of X, Y , L and M. As far as the care by the consumers
is concerned all consumers are assumed to be identical. To focus on the
eﬀects of liability rules when consumers misperceive the risk, the product
market is assumed to be competitive.6 There are n identical ﬁrms each
producing an output of q units. TAC per ﬁrm are q[x+y+L(x,y)], and
TAC of all products by all ﬁrms are nq[x+y+L(x,y)]. We denote con-
sumer i0s marginal consumption beneﬁt from the product by ui(z) and
u0
i(z) < 0. Let, P(z) be the industry’s inverse demand function. Let,
C(q) denote the production costs for a ﬁrm. Throughout the paper it is
assumed that C(q) is such that there is a unique positive output level at
6As is the case here, it is shown in Epple and Raviv (1978) and Geistfeld (2000) that as long as
TAC per unit of product are independent of output level, the results obtained in a competitive setting
will hold more or less even when the market is not competitive. For the eﬀects of market-power on
the output and care by ﬁrms and the related issues see Beals, Craswell and Salop (1981), Schwartz
and Wild (1982), Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), Marino (1988 a, b), Spulber (1989, pp.408-410),
Faulhaber and Boyd (1989), and Boyd (1994).
7which the ﬁrm’s average costs of production, C(q)/q, are minimized.7
Social surplus is equal to the beneﬁts from nq units of the product that
consumers derive (approximated by the area under the industry’s inverse
demand curve) minus total costs of production (the sum of costs of pro-
duction and the accident costs). Social objective is to choose x, y, q
and n so as to maximize the social surplus8
Z nq
0 P(z)dz − nC(q) − nq[x + y + L(x,y)]. (1)
The ﬁrst order optimization conditions for q and n, respectively, are





+ x + y + L(x,y). (3)
Let ¯ q and ¯ n uniquely solve (2) and (3) simultaneously. That is, given
x and y as levels of care taken by the consumer and the ﬁrm, when
n = ¯ n, at ¯ q marginal consumption beneﬁt is equal to marginal total cost
of the product - marginal cost of production plus TAC of the product.
And, when q = ¯ q, at ¯ n marginal consumption beneﬁt is equal to average
total cost of the product. In other words, given the care taken by the
consumer and the ﬁrm, ¯ q is the optimum output per ﬁrm, and ¯ n is the
7When C(.) is strictly convex, the assumption that each ﬁrm produces same output does not entail
any signiﬁcant loss of generality (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, ch. 10).
8P(z) can be viewed as the marginal social beneﬁt of the product when aggregate quantitity
demanded is z. For similar speciﬁcations of the social objective function see Miceli (1997, ch. 2),
Boyd (1994), Shavell (1987 ch. 3), and Polinsky (1980), also see Endres and L¨ udeke (1998).
8optimum number of ﬁrms in the industry. Since ¯ q and ¯ n are functions
of x and y, overall eﬃciency in terms of output and number of ﬁrms in
the industry requires that both the parties take eﬃcient care. Let ¯ q = q∗
and ¯ n = n∗ when both the parties take eﬃcient - TAC minimizing - care.
Remark 1: Since TAC are assumed to be linear in output, socially op-
timum choice of x and y is independent of the quantity of the product
produced/consumed (see eq. (1)). Therefore, eﬃciency requires that
the parties always take TAC minimizing care. Furthermore, (2) and (3)
imply that C0(q) = C(q)/q. Thus, ¯ q is the eﬃcient level of output
(¯ q = q∗), irrespective of what of x and y are.
Consumers may be imperfectly informed about the product related
risk either because (i) they do not observe the care taken by the pro-
ducer ﬁrm, and/or (ii) (even if they knew the level of care taken by
the ﬁrm) they do not know the value of function L(x,y) correctly. We
assume that consumers’ knowledge is limited by both the types of imper-
fection: a consumer does not observe the care taken by the ﬁrm, and he
does not necessarily know the function L correctly. Assume that when
the expected loss is L(x,y), the consumer perceives it to be Lc(x,y),
where Lc may not be equal to L. It will be assumed that ﬁrms know the
function L correctly but do not observe the care taken by the consumers
while using the product.
2.2ProductLiabilityRules:
9A product liability rule (PLR) uniquely determines the proportions in
which the consumer and the ﬁrm will share the loss H, in the event of an
accident, as a function of the proportions of their (non)negligence. Let
I denote the closed unit interval [0,1]. Given X, Y , L, and (x∗,y∗) ∈
M, we deﬁne functions g : X 7→ I and h : Y 7→ I such that:
g(x) = x/x∗ if x < x∗,
= 1 otherwise; and
h(y) = y/y∗ if y < y∗,
= 1 otherwise.
A PLR may specify the due care levels for both the parties, or for
only one of them, or for none.9 If the rule speciﬁes the due care levels
for both the parties, x∗ and y∗ used in the deﬁnitions of functions g and
h will be taken to be identical with the legally speciﬁed due care levels
for the consumer and the ﬁrm, respectively. If the rule speciﬁes the due
care level for only the ﬁrm, y∗ used in the deﬁnition of function h will
be taken to be identical with the legally speciﬁed due care level for the
ﬁrm, and x∗ used in the deﬁnition of g will be taken as any element of
{x ∈ X | (x,y∗) ∈ M}. Similarly, if the rule speciﬁes due care level for
only the consumer, x∗ used in the deﬁnition of function g will be taken
to be identical with the legally speciﬁed due care level, and y∗ used in
the deﬁnition of h will be any element of {y ∈ Y | (x∗,y) ∈ M}. If the
rule does not specify due care level for any party then any element of M
can be used in the deﬁnitions of g and h. In any case (x∗,y∗) is TAC
9The rules of negligence with defense, strict liability with defense, and strict liability, for example,
are respectively the rules with legal due care levels for both the consumer and the ﬁrm, for only the
consumer, and for none.
10minimizing.
In other words, we are assuming that the legal due care standard for
a party, wherever applicable, is set at a level commensurate with the
objective of minimizing the TAC. This standard assumption is crucial for
the eﬃciency of a PLR.
A PLR can be deﬁned as a rule that speciﬁes the proportions in which
the consumer and the ﬁrm will bear the loss, in the event of accident,
as a function of proportions of their (non)negligence.10 Formally, a PLR
is a function f : [0,1]2 7→ [0,1]2,such that:
f(g(x), h(y)) = (s, t) = (s[g(x), h(y)],t[g(x), h(y)]), s + t = 1,
where s ≥ 0 [ t ≥ 0] is the proportion of loss that the consumer [ﬁrm]
will be required to bear.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium:
As mentioned above, consumers do not observe the care taken by the
ﬁrms. As regards to consumers’ knowledge of the expected loss func-
tion L, we assume that though a consumer may not know the exact
value of the function L for given x and y, he knows that L is such
that TAC are minimum when he opts for x∗ and the ﬁrm opts for the
corresponding optimum level of care, denoted by y∗. In other words, Lc,
10Given above deﬁnitions of g and h, h(y) = 1 would mean that the ﬁrm is taking at least the
due care and it would be called nonnegligent. h(y) < 1 would mean that the ﬁrm is negligent. h(y)
and 1 − h(y) will be its proportions of nonnegligence and negligence, respectively. Similarly, for the
consumer.
11the expected loss function as perceived by the consumer, is such that
(x∗,y∗) solves min{x+y +Lc(x,y)}. Formally, for any given X, Y , L
and (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, is such that:
Assumption (A3) (∀(x,y) ∈ X ×Y )[x∗+y∗+Lc(x∗,y∗) ≤ x+y+
Lc(x,y)].
It should be noted that the only restriction imposed by (A3) is that
Lc be such that the sum x + y + Lc(x,y) is minimum at (x∗,y∗).11 It
is assumed that whenever the risk is positive the consumer perceives it
to be so, i.e., Lc > 0 whenever L > 0. Finally, we make an implicit but
otherwise standard assumption that when the consumer opts for x∗ and
the ﬁrm opts for y∗, expected accident loss is positive.
Assumption (A4) For every X, Y , L, and (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, L(x∗,y∗) >
0.
11One might argue that when the consumer does not know the function L correctly, he might not
know of TAC minimizing pair of care levels; Lc might not satisfy (A3). Here it should be noted
that the PLR itself may provide the consumers with the relevant information. As a matter-of-fact
some rules, such as the rules of negligence with the defense of contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, strict liability with the defense of dual contributory negligence, specify due care standard
for both the parties. Since the due levels of care are assumed to be set at levels that are appropriate
for eﬃciency (under such rules at (x∗,y∗)), the consumer - because of this common knowledge - will
get to know of TAC minimizing pair, (x∗,y∗), from the legal standards itself. Therefore, the above
problem of information will not arise under such rules and Lc should satisfy (A3). Moreover, we will
show that a PLR can be eﬃcient only if it sets due care standard for the consumer. Under such a
rule the consumer, again, will get to know of x∗ (the ﬁrm of course knows of y∗). In any case we
will show that our results will hold even when (A3) is relaxed.
12(A4) implies Lc(x∗,y∗) > 0. (A3) and (A4) are mainly for the ex-
pository purpose. We will show that our results will still hold in most of
the cases when (A3) or (A4) is relaxed.
Let, X, Y , L, and (x∗,y∗) ∈ M be given. If accident with a loss of H
materializes, the court will require the ﬁrm to bear t[g(x),h(y)]H(x,y),
in the form liability payment to be made to the consumer. t[g(x),h(y)]
will be determined by the PLR in force. The expected accident costs
of a party are the sum of the cost of care taken by it plus its ex-
pected liability. A ﬁrm’s expected accident costs, therefore, are: y +
t[g(x),h(y)]π(x,y)H(x,y), i.e., y + t[g(x),h(y)]L(x,y). As far as the
consumer is concerned since he perceives the expected loss to be equal
to Lc(x,y), he will perceive the expected liability payment to be equal
to t[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y). Therefore, from a consumer’s perspective his
expected accident costs are: x + Lc(x,y) − t[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y), i.e.,
x + s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y), as 1 − t = s.
Let p be the per unit market price of the product. Assumption of
competitive market implies that p is given for both parties and is equal
to the marginal total cost of production - marginal cost of production
plus marginal expected liability of the ﬁrm. When consumers misperceive
the risk, the demand for the product will be a function of the perceived
full price. Given the relevant PLR and the level of care taken by the ﬁrm,
perceived full price per unit of product is equal to the market price plus
the consumer’s expected accident costs, i.e, p+x+s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y).
13Consumers’ problem is equivalent to that of choosing the quantity Q and
the care x to maximize
Z Q
0 P(z)dz − pQ − Q[x + s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y)] (4)
The ﬁrst order condition (foc) for Q is12
P(Q) = p + x + s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y) (5)
Given the PLR and the care taken by the consumer, a ﬁrm’s problem is
to choose the quantity q and the care y so as to maximize
pq − C(q) − q[y + t[g(x),h(y)]L(x,y)] (6)
The ﬁrst order condition for q is
p = C0(q) + y + t[g(x),h(y)]L(x,y)] (7)
Free entry condition implies that proﬁt of each ﬁrm will be zero, i.e.,
pq = C(q) + q[y + t[g(x),h(y)]L(x,y)] (8)
From (4)&(5) it is clear that optimum level of care by the consumers
is independent of their levels of consumption. Therefore, for given y, a
rational and risk-neutral consumer will choose x that minimizes his ex-
pected accident costs, x+s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y), in the light of the PLR
in force, independent of his level of consumption. Analogous argument in
12Note that a consumer i’s problem is to choose the quantity qi and the level of care x to maximize
R qi
0 ui(z)dz−pqi−qi[x+s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y)] resulting in foc as ui(qi) = p+x+s[g(x),h(y)]Lc(x,y).
This means that given consumers’ misperception about L, when consumers optimally choose their
demand for the product, at these individual demand levels each consumer’s marginal beneﬁt, ui(z)
is equal to P(Q). Therefore, (4) is maximized w.r.t. Q if ceteris-paribus each consumer chooses his
demand for the product optimally.
14view of (6)&(7) implies that, for given x, the ﬁrm will choose y that inde-
pendently minimizes its expected accident costs, y+t[g(x),h(y)]L(x,y).
An equilibrium is deﬁned as a tuple < ˆ Q, ˆ p, ˆ q, ˆ n, ˆ x, ˆ y > such that:
ˆ Q = ˆ nˆ q; and ˆ Q, ˆ p, and ˆ q satisfy (5), (7) and (8); and (ˆ x, ˆ y) is Nash
Equilibrium (N.E.).
Now, from (5)&(7) in equilibrium we have
P(Q) = P(nq) = C0(q) + x + y + sLc(x,y) + tL(x,y) (9)
and from (5) and (8) we get
P(Q) = P(nq) =
C(q)
q
+ x + y + sLc(x,y) + tL(x,y) (10)
where s = s[g(x),h(y)] and t = t[g(x),h(y)].
2.4 Eﬃcient Product Liability Rules:
Given the care taken by the consumers and ﬁrms, socially optimum quan-
tity per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms in the industry are given by (2) and
(3). However, when consumers misperceive the risk, the actual output
per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms are given by (9) and (10). Generally the
solution to (9)&(10) will be diﬀerent from that of (2)&(3). (9)&(10),
however, imply that C0(q) = C(q)/q, i.e., in equilibrium output per ﬁrm
will be eﬃcient (Remark 1). But, from (9) and (10), even if we assume
that both the parties are taking eﬃcient care, when consumers misper-
ceive the risk, i.e., when Lc 6= L the number of ﬁrms in the industry
will not necessarily be eﬃcient. Therefore, a PLR may cause ineﬃciency
15on the following two counts: (a) it may induce the parties to take in-
eﬃcient care, and (b) it may induce ineﬃcient (total) production and
hence consumption. From the above discussion it should be noted that
the second kind of ineﬃciency might occur even when that of the ﬁrst
type is not there.
Remark 2: If under the rule s = 0 or t = 1 in equilibrium, (9)&(10)
will exactly be the same as (2)&(3) and, therefore, given the care taken
by the parties both the quantity produced and the number of ﬁrms will
be eﬃcient. Further, if the rule induces eﬃcient care then the rule will
be eﬃcient in terms of care, output and the number of ﬁrms. Just op-
posite will be the case when s 6= 0, in equilibrium.
An application of a PLR is characterized by the speciﬁcation of X,
Y , L, (c∗,d∗) ∈ M, and C(q). As mentioned earlier, a PLR can be
(in)eﬃcient in two respects; one the care taken by the parties and, two,
the total quantity of the product produced/consumed. As regards to
care, a rule is said to be eﬃcient iﬀ in equilibrium it induces eﬃcient
care by both the parties, or iﬀ every Nash Equilibrium is TAC minimizing,
and there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium.13 To be eﬃcient on both
the counts, the rule should also induce eﬃcient output for the industry.
A PLR, f, is said to be eﬃcient for a given application iﬀ, in equi-
13Through out the paper whenever we refer to N.E., the strategy of a party will refer to the level
of care taken by this party. In this paper we consider only the pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
16librium it induces eﬃcient care by both the parties, output per ﬁrm and
number of ﬁrms in the industry. Formally, f is eﬃcient for given X, Y ,
L, (c∗,d∗) ∈ M, and C(q), iﬀ: (∀(¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X × Y ) [(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E.
→ (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ M] & (∃(¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X × Y )[(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E.]; and in equilib-
rium q∗ and n∗ solve (9) and (10), simultaneously. A PLR, f, is deﬁned
to be eﬃcient iﬀ it is eﬃcient for every possible choice of X, Y , L,
(c∗,d∗) ∈ M, and C(q).
3. Characterization of eﬃcient product liability rules
3.1 When consumers know the value of expected loss func-
tion L:
When consumers know the expected loss function L(x,y) correctly,
Lc = L. As a result, (9)&(10) will be identical with (2)&(3) and,
therefore, ¯ q and ¯ n will solve (9)&(10). Thus, when consumers know
L(x,y) correctly, given the care by consumers and ﬁrms, both the quan-
tity produced and the number of ﬁrms will be eﬃcient irrespective of the
PLR in force and the question of eﬃciency is reduced to whether or not
the rule induces eﬃcient care. It can be shown that when each party
observe L correctly but does not observe the care taken by the other
party, a liability rule f will induce eﬃcient care in its every application
satisfying (A1) and (A2), iﬀ f is such that:14 g < 1 → [f(g,1) = (1,0)],
and h < 1 → [f(1,h) = (0,1)]. In view of this result, we can make the
following claim.
14For proof and detailed discussion see Jain and Singh (2002), and Singh (2001).
17Theorem 1 When Lc = L, a product liability rule is eﬃcient for every
possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, satisfying (A1) and (A2), and
every C(q) iﬀ,
g < 1 → [f(g,1) = (1,0)], and h < 1 → [f(1,h) = (0,1)].
As a corollary to Theorem 1, we get the results proved in Shavell
(1987, ch. 3), Landes and Posner (1987, ch. 10), Miceli (1997, pp.
29-33) that when the consumers know the risk associated with diﬀerent
care levels (but do not observe the care taken by the ﬁrm), various neg-
ligence criterion based rules induce eﬃcient care by both the parties and
hence are eﬃcient.
3.1 When consumers observe the value of expected loss func-
tion L with error:
In this section we provide complete characterization of eﬃcient PLRs
when consumers observe L with error, i.e., when Lc 6= L. Of course,
they do not observe the care taken by the ﬁrms. We provide a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency of a PLR. Formally, we show that
when Lc 6= L, a PLR f is eﬃcient iﬀ f satisﬁes the condition of ‘negli-
gent consumer’s liability’ (NCL). First, we deﬁne the condition NCL.
Condition of Negligent Consumer’s Liability (NCL):
A product liability rule f is said to satisfy the condition NCL iﬀ its
structure is such that (i) whenever the consumer is nonnegligent, i.e.,
he is taking at least the due care, the entire loss in the event of accident
is borne by the ﬁrm irrespective of the level of care taken by the ﬁrm,
18and (ii) when consumer is negligent and the ﬁrm is not, the entire loss
in the event of accident is borne by the consumer. Formally, a product
liability rule f satisﬁes condition NCL iﬀ:
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) = (0,1)] and (∀g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) = (1,0)].
Proposition 1 If a product liability rule satisﬁes condition NCL then for
every possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4), (x∗,y∗) a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: Let the PLR, f, satisfy the condition NCL. Take any arbitrary
X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4). As f satisﬁes
condition NCL, f(1,1) = (0,1). Let y = y∗ be opted by the ﬁrm.
Then, for all x ≥ x∗ expected accident costs of the consumer are x +
s[g(x),h(y∗)]Lc(x,y∗) = x, as when x ≥ x∗, s[g(x),h(y∗)] = 0 by
NCL. Therefore, if the consumer chooses x∗ his expected accident costs
are only x∗. Now, consider a choice of x0 6= x∗ by the consumer. First,
consider the case when x0 > x∗. In this case his expected accident costs
clearly are x0, and he will be strictly worse-oﬀ choosing x0 rather than
x∗.
Next, consider the case x0 < x∗. For x0 < x∗ expected accident costs
of the consumer are x0 + s[g(x0),(y∗)]Lc(x0,y∗), i.e., x0 + Lc(x0,y∗),
as when x0 < x∗, s[g(x0),(y∗)] = 1 by condition NCL. But, x0 can be
better than x∗ for the consumer only if x0 + Lc(x0,y∗) < x∗, i.e., only
if x0 + y∗ + Lc(x0,y∗) < x∗ + y∗. This implies x0 + y∗ + Lc(x0,y∗) <
x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗). But, in view of (A3) this is a contradiction.
Thus, given that y∗ is opted by the ﬁrm, x∗ is a best response by the
19consumer. Similarly, it can easily be demonstrated that given x∗ opted
by the consumer, y∗ is a best response by the ﬁrm. Which establishes
that (x∗,y∗) is a N.E. •
Proposition 2 If a product liability rule satisﬁes condition NCL then for
every possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4),
(∀(¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X × Y )[(¯ x, ¯ y) is a Nash Equilibrium → (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ M].
Proof: Let PLR f satisfy condition NCL. Take any arbitrary X, Y , L,
(x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4). Suppose (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X × Y
is a N.E. (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. implies that if ¯ y is opted by the ﬁrm, expected
accident costs of the consumer are minimum at ¯ x, i.e.,
(∀x ∈ X)[¯ x + s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x + s[g(x),h(¯ y)]Lc(x, ¯ y)] (11)
and if ¯ x is opted by the consumer, expected accident costs of the ﬁrm
are minimum at ¯ y, i.e.,
(∀y ∈ Y )[¯ y + t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y + t[g(¯ x),h(y)]L(¯ x,y)] (12)
Now, (11), in particular, → ¯ x+s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗+s[g(x∗),h(¯ y)]Lc(x∗, ¯ y),
i.e.,
¯ x + s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ (13)
as s[g(x∗),h(¯ y)] = 0 by condition NCL. And, (12)→
¯ y + t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗ + t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)]L(¯ x,y∗) (14)
20Adding (13) and (14)
¯ x+¯ y+s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y)+t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗+y∗+t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)]L(¯ x,y∗)
(15)
Case 1: ¯ x ≥ x∗:
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) = (0,1)] by condition NCL. Thus, when ¯ x ≥ x∗,
s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 0, t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 1, and t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 1. Therefore,
from (15), (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ x+¯ y+L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗+y∗+L(¯ x,y∗). Now,
¯ x ≥ x∗ → L(¯ x,y∗) ≤ L(x∗,y∗). Therefore, we get ¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤
x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗). But, ¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≥ x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗), as
(x∗,y∗) ∈ M. This implies that ¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) = x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗).
Which means (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ M. Thus,
¯ x ≥ x∗&(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ M (16)
Case 2: ¯ x < x∗:
Subcase 1: ¯ y ≥ y∗: As (∀g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) = (1,0) by condition NCL,
in this case s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 1, t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 0 and t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 0.
So, (15), reduces to ¯ x+¯ y+Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗+y∗. Thus, ¯ x+¯ y+Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) <
x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗), since (A4) implies Lc(x∗,y∗) > 0. Which is a
contradiction in view of (A3). Therefore,
if ¯ x < x∗&¯ y ≥ y∗, (¯ x, ¯ y) cannot be a N.E. (17)
Subcase 2: ¯ y < y∗: Suppose f(g(¯ x),h(¯ y)) = (¯ s,¯ t). Let
t∗ =
y∗ − ¯ y
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
and s∗ =
x∗ − ¯ x
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
.
There are two possible cases: (i) ¯ t ≥ t∗, or (ii) ¯ t < t∗. When (i) holds,
from (14), (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ y + ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗, since when ¯ x < x∗,
21t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 0 by NCL. That is, we get ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗ − ¯ y, i.e.,
y∗ − ¯ y
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗−¯ y, as ¯ t ≥ t∗ → t∗L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y).
So, when (i) holds (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗, i.e.,
¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗), since L(x∗,y∗) > 0, by (A4).
Which is a contradiction because (x∗,y∗) ∈ M.
When (ii) holds, i.e., when ¯ t < t∗, ¯ s + ¯ t = 1 = s∗ + t∗ implies ¯ s > s∗.
When ¯ s > s∗, from (13) (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ sLc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ − ¯ x. Since
Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) > 0,15 s∗ < ¯ s → s∗Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) < ¯ sLc(¯ x, ¯ y). Thus, in this subcase
(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. implies s∗Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗ − ¯ x, i.e.,
x∗ − ¯ x
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗−¯ x, i.e., ¯ x+¯ y+Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗+y∗,
a contradiction in view of (A3). Therefore,
if ¯ x < x∗&¯ y < y∗,(¯ x, ¯ y) cannot be a N.E. (18)
Finally, (16) - (18) → [(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ M]. •
From the proof of Proposition 2 we have the following remark.
Remark 3: If a PLR satisﬁes condition NCL then for every possible
choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), (¯ x, ¯ y)
is a N.E. implies that ¯ x = x∗. That is, in every accident context in
equilibrium the consumer will opt for x∗, the due level of care.
15That L(¯ x, ¯ y) > 0 is easy to see. L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≥ 0 and when ¯ x < x∗&¯ y < y∗, L(¯ x, ¯ y) = 0 would
imply that (x∗,y∗) 6∈ M, a contradiction. Thus, L(¯ x, ¯ y) > 0, and by assumption Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) > 0.
22Propositions 1 and 2 show that NCL is a suﬃcient condition for a PLR
to be TAC minimizing, or to induce eﬃcient care by both the parties.
Next, we show that NCL is a necessary condition for eﬃciency of a PLR.
Lemma 1 For a PLR f, if [f(1,1) = (0,1)]& (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6=
(0,1)], then there exist X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4), such that f is not TAC minimizing.
Proof: Given f(1,1) = (0,1) and (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)].
Suppose, f(1,h) = (s1,t1)], where t1 ∈ [0,1). Let k > 0. As t1 < 1,
t1k < k. Choose r > 0 such that t1k < r < k. Now, consider the
accident context characterized by the following speciﬁcation of X, Y , L
and Lc: X = {0,x0}, x0 > 0,
Y = {0,hy0,y0}, where y0 = r/(1 − h),
L(0,0) = ∆ + x0 + hy0 + k + δ, where ∆ ≥ 0, and δ > 0,
L(x0,0) = ∆ + hy0 + k, L(0,hy0) = ∆ + x0 + k + δ, L(0,y0) =
∆ + x0 + δ,
L(x0,hy0) = ∆ + k, and L(x0,y0) = ∆.
It is clear that (x0,y0) is a unique TAC minimizing conﬁguration. Let
(x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0). Suppose Lc satisﬁes (A3). Given x0 opted by the
consumer, f(1,1) = (0,1) implies that if ﬁrm chooses y0 its expected
accident costs are y0 + ∆. And, if it chooses hy0, its expected costs
are hy0 + t1(∆ + k). But, y0 − hy0 > t1k or y0 > hy0 + t1k. Thus,
y0 +∆ > hy0 +t1(∆+k), since t1 < 1. That is, given x0 opted by the
consumer, the ﬁrm is better-oﬀ choosing hy0 rather than y0 and, hence
the uniquely TAC minimizing conﬁguration, (x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0) is not a
23N.E. Therefore, there exist X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying
(A1)- (A4), such that f is not TAC minimizing. •
Lemma 2 For a PLR f if (∃g ∈ [0,1)) [f(g,1) 6= (1,0)] holds, then
there exist X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4) such
that f is not TAC minimizing.
Proof: Given (∃g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) 6= (1,0)]. Let, f(g,1) = (s1,t1)
where s1 < 1. For any k > 0, s1k < k. Choose r > 0 such that
s1k < r < k. Now consider the following speciﬁcation of X, Y and L:
X = {0, gx0, x0}, where x0 = r/(1 − g),
Y = {0, y0}, y0 > 0,
L(0,0) = ∆ + gx0 + k + y0 + δ, where δ > 0, and ∆ ≥ 0
L(gx0,0) = ∆ + k + y0 + δ, L(x0,0) = ∆ + y0 + δ,
L(0,y0) = ∆ + gx0 + k, L(gx0,y0) = ∆ + k, L(x0,y0) = ∆.
Again, (x0,y0) is a unique TAC minimizing conﬁguration. Let (x∗,y∗) =
(x0,y0). For simplicity assume that Lc = βL, where β > 0. Now, let
y0 be opted by the ﬁrm. When ∆ = 0, it is easy to see that when β ∈
(0,1], the consumer will be better oﬀ choosing gx0 rather than x0. In
particular, even when β = 1, i.e., Lc = L, uniquely TAC minimizing pair
(x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0) is not a N.E. When ∆ > 0, if the consumer chooses
x0 his expected accident costs are at least x0. And, if he chooses gx0, his
expected costs are gx0+s1β(∆+k). Now, whenever k/(∆+k) ≥ β >
min{x0/(gx0 + k), y0/(y0 + δ)} it is easy to see that Lc satisﬁes (A3)
and gx0+s1β(∆+k) ≤ gx0+s1k. As gx0+s1k < x0 by construction,
gx0+s1β(∆+k) < x0. Thus, (x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0) is not a N.E. Therefore,
24there exist X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4) such
that when (∃g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) 6= (1,0)] holds, (x∗,y∗) is not a N.E.
Finally, the fact that in the above context, (x∗,y∗) is uniquely TAC
minimizing implies that in this context f is not TAC minimizing. •
Proposition 3 A product liability rule is eﬃcient for every possible
choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and ev-
ery C(q) only if it satisﬁes condition NCL.
Proof: Suppose not. Suppose there exists a PLR, f, such that f violates
NCL and is eﬃcient for every possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M,
Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and every C(q). f violates NCL →
(i) (∃h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)], or (ii) (∃g ∈ [0,1)) [f(g,1) 6= (1,0)].
Case 1: Suppose, (i), i.e., (∃h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)]holds. In this
case there are only two mutually exclusive possibilities: f(1,1) = (0,1)
or f(1,1) 6= (0,1).
Subcase 1: f(1,1) = (0,1): When f(1,1) = (0,1) is true, (∃h ∈
[0,1])[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)] → (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)]. But, when
f(1,1) = (0,1) and (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)], from Lemma 1, f
cannot be TAC minimizing for all its applications. As a consequence,
f cannot be eﬃcient for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying
(A1)-(A4), and every C(q).
Subcase 2: f(1,1) 6= (0,1): Let f(1,1) = (s1,t1), where s1 > 0. Now,
consider any X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), such
that (x∗,y∗) is uniquely TAC minimizing. In such contexts whenever
there is no N.E., or when (x∗,y∗) is not a unique N.E., f is not TAC
25minimizing and therefore not eﬃcient. And, when (x∗,y∗) is a unique
N.E., though TAC minimizing, f is not eﬃcient. Because in equilibrium
s = s1 > 0, so (9)&(10) will be diﬀerent from (2)&(3). Therefore
outcome will not be eﬃcient in terms of total quantity produced (Remark
2).
Case 2: Let (ii) hold. In this case also f not eﬃcient for every X, Y , L,
(x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and every C(q), because, from
Lemma 2, for some X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, and Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4), f is not TAC minimizing.
Therefore it cannot be the case that f violates condition NCL and is still
eﬃcient for every possible X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4), and every C(q). •
Theorem 2 A product liability rule is eﬃcient for every possible X, Y ,
L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and every C(q) iﬀ it satisﬁes
the condition NCL.
Proof: Take any arbitrary X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)-
(A4), and C(q). Suppose PLR, f satisﬁes condition NCL. By Proposi-
tions 1 and 2, f is TAC minimizing. Furthermore, under f, (¯ x, ¯ y) is a
N.E. → ¯ x = x∗ (Remark 3). ¯ x = x∗ and condition NCL imply that in
equilibrium s = 0 and t = 0. As a consequence (9)&(10) will be iden-
tical with (2)&(3). This, in view of the fact that both the parties will
opt for TAC minimzing care, implies that q∗ and n∗ will solve (9)&(10),
simultaneously (Remark 2). Hence f is eﬃcient.
On the other hand, if a PLR is eﬃcient for every possible choice of X,
26Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and C(q), by Proposition
3 it satisﬁes NCL. •
Theorem 2 establishes that the PLRs that satisfy condition NCL are
eﬃcient for every possible application irrespective of the consumers’ mis-
perception about the risk as long as Lc satisﬁes (A3). On the contrary,
the PLRs that violate the condition cannot be eﬃcient in every possible
application. The rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory
negligence holds the consumer liable iﬀ he was negligent. The rule can
be deﬁned as: (g = 1 → s = 0), and (g < 1 → s = 1). Similarly,
the rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory negli-
gence can be deﬁned as (Dari Mattiacci (2002)): (g = 1 → s = 0) and
(g < 1&h < 1 → s = 0) and (g < 1&h = 1 → s = 1). It is easy to
check that both of these rule satisfy the condition NCL and therefore
are eﬃcient. Based upon fulﬁllment or otherwise of the condition NCL,
we immediately get the following corollary from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 The rules of strict liability with the defense of contributory
negligence, and strict liability with the defense of dual contributory neg-
ligence, are eﬃcient (in terms of care, output per ﬁrm and the number of
ﬁrms in the industry) for every possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M,
Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A4), and every C(q). On the other hand, the rules
of no liability, strict liability, negligence, negligence with the defense of
contributory negligence, and comparative negligence are not.
Assumption (A5) X,Y, and L are such that ]M = 1, i.e., (x∗,y∗)
27is a uniquely TAC minimizing pair.
Remarks 4: In the literature on liability rules, (A5) is the standard
assumption about X, Y , and L. Also the results of Theorem 2, will hold
if in stead of our more general assumption (A1) and (A2) we assume
(A5). In the latter case suﬃciency results follow immediately. Necessity
claim will follow from observing that the necessity proofs, in addition to
being consistent with (A2), are such that the TAC minimizing conﬁgu-
ration is unique.
Theorem 2 is proved under the assumptions (A1)-(A4). Only restric-
tive assumptions are (A3) and (A4). First, consider the implications for
eﬃciency of a PLR when assumption (A4) - X, Y , L are such that
L(x∗,y∗) > 0 - is relaxed. ((A4), again, is a standard assumption). As
L(x∗,y∗) ≥ 0 always, relaxing (A4) would mean that L(x∗,y∗) ≥ 0.
When (A4) is relaxed our results will still hold when (A5) holds. (In
that case the semi-equality in assumption (A3) will be replaced by strict
inequality). To see this, note that while proving Proposition 1 the argu-
ment that L(x∗,y∗) > 0 is not used at all. While proving Proposition
2 this argument is used only in Case 2, when ¯ x < x∗. In this case, the
claims will still hold if instead of (A4) we use the argument that (x∗,y∗)
is uniquely TAC minimizing.16 Also, as noted in the relevant proofs,
16In Subcase 1, instead of inequality ¯ x+ ¯ y(= y∗)+Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗ +y∗ +Lc(x∗,y∗), we will get
the semi-inequality ¯ x + ¯ y(= y∗) + Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗), and in Subcase 2, instead of
inequality ¯ x+ ¯ y +L(¯ x, ¯ y) < x∗ +y∗ +L(x∗,y∗), we will get the semi-inequality ¯ x+ ¯ y +L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤
x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗). Both of which are contradictions as (x∗,y∗) is uniquely TAC minimizing.
28Proposition 3 holds even when L(x∗,y∗) ≥ 0.
Remark 5: From the deﬁnition of condition NCL it is clear that the
condition, in particular, requires that the rule sets the (non)negligence
standard for the consumer, at a level that is appropriate for the objec-
tive of TAC minimization. When the rule does not set the negligence
standard for the consumer, condition NCL cannot be fulﬁlled.
Theorem 3 shows that the characterization of eﬃcient PLRs does not
change even if we relax (A3) and (A4), provided (A5) holds. Violation
of the assumption (A3) would mean that Lc may not satisfy (A3). First
we prove a Lemma.
Lemma 3 Under a PLR, f, if (∀h ∈ [0,1])[g < 1 → f(g,h) = (1,0) &
g = 1 → f(g,h) = (0,1)] holds then for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M,
Lc, and every C(q), f is eﬃcient.
Proof: Let PLR, f, be as in the claim. Take any X, Y , L and (x∗,y∗) ∈
M satisfying (A5). Under f the consumer will never opt for x > x∗, i.e.,
the consumer will always choose a x such that x ≤ x∗. Knowing this, the
ﬁrm will not choose y > y∗,17 i.e., the ﬁrm will always choose a y such
that y ≤ y∗. In this backdrop, even when a consumer does not know of
the y that along with x∗ will make the TAC minimizing pair, a rational
consumer will know that the ﬁrm’s care will be less than or equal to the
level that is appropriate for the objective of TAC minimization. Now, if
17When (x∗,y∗) is uniquely TAC minimizing, in this subcase y = y∗ [y = 0] is a uniquely best
response for the ﬁrm given x∗ [x < x∗] opted by the consumer.
29the consumer opts for x∗ his expected costs are simply x∗, on the other
hand, if he opts for some x < x∗ his expected costs will be x+Lc(x,y).
Therefore, the consumer will opt for a x < x∗ only if x+Lc(x,y) ≤ x∗,
i.e., only if x + y + Lc(x,y) ≤ x∗ + y. Since the consumer knows that
the y opted by the ﬁrm is less than or equal to the socially optimum
level of care for the ﬁrm, he will know that the sum x∗ + y is less than
or equal to the minimum TAC. Thus, x+y +Lc(x,y) ≤ x∗ +y implies
that the consumer knows that x + y + Lc(x,y) is less than or equal to
the minimum TAC. But, this is a contradiction since when x 6= x∗, as is
the case here, the consumer already knows that irrespective of y, TAC at
(x,y) are greater than the minimum TAC.18 Thus, he will be better-oﬀ
choosing x∗ rather than any x 6= x∗, i.e., opting x∗ is a strictly dominant
strategy for the consumer. This gives us s = 0, in equilibrium. Knowing
this the ﬁrm will realise that it will be bearing the entire expected loss
and will take eﬃcient care. Finally, in view of s = 0, (9)&(10) will be
identical with (2)&(3). Therefore, f is eﬃcient.
Theorem 3 A product liability rule is eﬃcient for every possible X, Y ,
L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, satisfying (A5), and every C(q) iﬀ it satisﬁes the
condition NCL.
Proof: Under any PLR, f, there are two mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive possibilities: (i) the rule speciﬁes the due care level for the
18When the TAC minimizing pair (x∗,y∗) is unique, the assumption that due care for a party (here,
the consumer) is set the level appropriate for the objective of TAC minimization implies that the
consumer knows x∗ from the legal standard, and he knows that whenever x 6= x∗, irrespective of the
y opted by the ﬁrm, TAC at (x, y) will be greater than the minimum TAC, i.e., the sum x+y+Lc(x,y)
will be greater than the minimum TAC whenever x 6= x∗.
30consumer, (ii) it does not.
Case 1: Suppose (ii) holds: When the rule does not specify the due care
for the consumer condition NCL cannot be fulﬁlled (Remark 5). From
Proposition 3, this implies that the rule cannot be eﬃcient even when
(A3) is satisﬁed, and the violation of (A3) would further add to the in-
eﬃciency of the rule. Thus, when (ii) is true our results hold.
Case 2: Suppose (i) holds: When (i) holds, under any rule, two possi-
bilities arise: either the rule sets the negligence standard for both the
parties, or it does not. That is, either the rule sets due standards (Sub-
case 1) for both the parties, or (Subcase 2) for only the consumer.
Subcase 1: Under this subcase, as is argued before (note n. ) the as-
sumption that due standards are set at the eﬃcient levels implies that
the consumer will get to know of the TAC minimizing pair of care lev-
els, (x∗,y∗), from the legal standards, which are a part of common
knowledge. Therefore, even when Lc 6= L, in this case - in view
of (A5) - for a rational consumer Lc will be such that (∀(x,y) ∈
X × Y )[x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗) ≤ x + y + Lc(x,y)]. Which is same
as satisfying (A3). Therefore, assumption (A3) is not needed, in this
subcase Lc satisﬁes the desired property by implication. Also, as argued
before, when (A5) holds and Lc is as in (A3), assumption (A3) is not
needed. That is, in the subcase, when (A5) holds, (A3) and (A4) are
not required. Therefore, in view of Theorem 2 and Remark 4, a PLR
is eﬃcient for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) ∈ M, Lc, and every C(q) iﬀ it
satisﬁes the condition NCL.
Subcase 2: In this subcase as there is no legal standard for the ﬁrm, the
31liability assignment cannot be conditioned on the care level of the ﬁrm; it
will have to be conditioned only on the care level of the consumer. Here,
condition NCL would imply that the rule, f, be such that a negligent
consumer bears the entire accident loss and a nonnegligent consumer
none, i.e., (∀h ∈ [0,1])[g < 1 → f(g,h) = (1,0) & g = 1 → f(g,h) =
(0,1)]. But, then by Lemma 3, f, is eﬃcient. condition NCL ensures
eﬃciency in this subcase also.
Violation of NCL in this case would mean that: (i) there exists
g ∈ [0,1) such that [f(g,h) 6= (1,0)] irrespective of h, or (ii) [f(1,h) 6=
(0,1)], irrespective of h. Now, (i), in particular, implies that there exists
g ∈ [0,1) such that [f(g,1) 6= (1,0)], and (ii), in particular, implies that
f(1,1) 6= (0,1).19 When (i) holds, arguing as in the proof for Lemma 2,
it can easily be demonstrated that f cannot be eﬃcient in all contexts.
When (ii) holds, as is shown the proof of Proposition 3, even if f is TAC
minimizing it cannot be eﬃcient. •
4. Concluding Remarks
The main result of the paper, Theorem 2, establishes that when the
consumers’ knowledge of the risk is imperfect a necessary and suﬃcient
19Note that when a rule sets due care standard for only one party, say the consumer, (as is the case
here) then the care level of the other party, the ﬁrm, does not play any role in liability assignment
at all, i.e., we are assuming that under a PLR, f, if for some particular h, f(g,h) = (x0,y0) then
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(g,h) = (x0,y0)]. That is, f is depends only on the proportion of negligence of the
party with due care standard, on g in this case. As a matter-of -fact all of the PLRs that set due
standard for only one party such as the rules of negligence and the strict liability with defense are like
this.
32condition for eﬃciency of a product liability rule is to satisfy the condi-
tion NCL. Irrespective of the magnitude of under or over estimation of
the risk by the consumers, if a product liability rule f satisﬁes condition
NCL then in every accident context satisfying (A1)-(A4), it is eﬃcient
in terms of care, output per ﬁrm, and the number of ﬁrms in the indus-
try. If f violates the condition then in at least some accident contexts20
and for some error on the part of the consumers, it will not be eﬃcient
in terms of care, output per ﬁrm, and the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
Now consider the accident contexts wherein either the economic ef-
ﬁciency requires no care by the consumers, or the consumers can take
no care, i.e., X = {0}. Such accident contexts are called unilateral-care
accident. In such contexts, x∗ = 0 and a rule f will satisfy condition
NCL iﬀ: (∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(g,h) = (0,1)], since in such contexts g = 1
always and the case g < 1 will not arise. Therefore, a PLR will satisfy
NCL iﬀ it holds the ﬁrm to be fully liable for accident loss irrespective
of the care taken by the two parties, or iﬀ the rule is of strict liability.
From the existing literature we know that the rule of strict liability is
eﬃcient in such contexts [Polinsky (1980), Shavell (1987, ch 3, pp. 67-
68) and Geistfeld (2000)]. In our analysis, condition NCL guarantees
eﬃciency. From Propositions 1 and 2 we know that both the parties will
take eﬃcient care with consumer taking no care at all.21 In view of this,
20From the proof of Proposition 3 it should be noted that in principle one can construct inﬁnitely
many such contexts.
21Note that Propositions 1 and 2 are valid when x∗ = 0. Of course, when x∗ = 0 or when X = {0},
the cases like x < x∗ will be trivial logically.
33suﬃciency of NCL follows from the fact that in such accident contexts,
s = 0 always, making (9)&(10) identical with (2)&(3) as is required by
the economic eﬃciency.
When a rule satisﬁes condition NCL since the consumer can ensure full
compensation in the event of accident merely by taking the due (eﬃcient)
level of care, even a risk-averse consumer will not take excessive care.
Risk-averse consumer, however, will have a stronger incentive to take due
care in order to avoid the risk of bearing accident loss. Therefore, our
results will be strengthened if we assume consumers to be risk-averse.
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